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As Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) have
become more common, ethical issues have arisen
regarding the deactivation of these devices. Goldstein
et al., have shown that both patients and cardiologists
consider ICD deactivation to be different from the
discontinuation of other life-sustaining treatments. It
cannot be argued ethically that ICDs raise new ques-
tions about the distinction between withholding and
withdrawing treatment, and neither the fact that they
are used intermittently, nor the duration of therapy, nor
the mere fact that they are located inside the body can
be considered unique to these devices and morally
decisive. However, frequent allusions to the fact that
they are located inside the body might provide a clue
about what bothers patients and physicians. As tech-
nology progresses, some interventions seem to become a
part of the patient as a unified whole person, completely
replacing body parts and lost physiological functions
rather than merely substituting for impaired structure
and function. If a life-sustaining intervention can be
considered a “replacement”—a part of the patient as a
unified whole person—then it seems that deactivation is
better classified as a case of killing rather than a case of
forgoing a life-sustaining treatment. ICDs are not a
“replacement” therapy in this sense. The deactivation of
an ICD is best classified, under the proper conditions,
as the forgoing of an extraordinary means of care. As
technology becomes more sophisticated, however, and
new interventions come to be best classified as “replace-
ments” (a heart transplant would be a good example),
“discontinuing” these interventions should be much
more morally troubling for those clinicians who oppose
euthanasia and assisted suicide.
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I
mplantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) have proven
very effective in preventing sudden cardiac death. Medi-
care’s decision to pay for these devices all but assures that
their use will soon become widespread.
1
Yet, like any technological innovation, these devices are not
an unalloyed good. Under certain circumstances it seems best
to discontinue treatment. For example, some patients receive
shocks so frequently that it becomes extremely burdensome. If
a Do Not Resuscitate order is written, whether on the basis of
the patient’s underlying cardiac disease or some comorbid
condition, it may be senseless to continue ICD use.
Several previously published ethical analyses of the dis-
continuation of ICD treatment have noted that some persons
believe that discontinuing an ICD is ethically different from
discontinuing other treatments. These analyses, by and large,
have declared such misgivings to be misguided and have
proceeded to analyze the discontinuation of ICD treatment
using standard bioethical categories such as patients’ rights,
refusal of unwanted therapy, autonomy, futility, and non-
maleficence.
2–6 Nonetheless, it seems that cardiologists and
patients have not read the bioethics literature. Cardiologists
and their patients view the deactivation of an ICD as
something special, and they discuss the possibility very
infrequently.
The 2 articles by Goldstein et al.
7,8 in this issue of JGIM are
an important step toward understanding this discrepancy
between ethical analysis and clinical reality. Broadly speaking,
these articles demonstrate the significant contribution that
qualitative studies can make to empirical research about
ethics, delving more deeply into the meanings behind answers
to survey questions. Specifically, these articles raise 2 impor-
tant points for ethics. First, they show that issues long thought
settled intellectually by ethicists, such as the difference
between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ments, still present lingering doubts for patients and practi-
tioners. Patients and cardiologists alike seem to view
implanting an ICD as a “bridge” that one crosses with no
possibility of return. Second, these rich qualitative data
suggest that there may be more going on here from a moral
point of view than the ethics of the 1970s can handle. As
technology progresses, ethics must keep pace.
What may be different about an ICD? Paola and Walker
9
have suggested that the new wrinkle may be that the
technology has been internalized—that an ICD may come to
be viewed as having “become a part of the patient.” Using the
philosophical term for the study of being, ontology, they
suggest that an external defibrillator is easier to forgo than
one that is internal to the person, because the latter may be
considered part of his or her being. Borrowing from the
concepts of property law, they coin the term “biofixture” to
describe technologies that have become part of a person. They
accept the morality of the discontinuation of an ICD because
they view this device as only partly a biofixture. They argue
that a heart transplant, however, would be a real biofixture,
and no one who is opposed to euthanasia would think it
permissible to “deactivate” a transplanted heart.
This interesting foray into ontology and ethics raises many
more questions than it answers, however. As biotechnological
progress marches forward, new interventions are challenging
our notions about the difference between killing and allowing
69to die. If one is opposed to euthanasia yet accepts the moral
permissibility of discontinuing life-sustaining treatments un-
der certain conditions, do new technologies, such as ICDs,
require that the line between killing and allowing to die be
redrawn? What is the “something intrinsic to the nature and
function of these devices”
8 that causes some to consider them
differently than other treatments?
WITHHOLDING VS. WITHDRAWING
The data from the articles by Goldstein et al. suggest that
both cardiologists and their patients tend to think that once
a device such as an ICD is in place, one ought not stop it. As
a general rule, philosophers have suggested that the condi-
tions under which one could justify withholding a treatment
are those under which one could justify withdrawing a
treatment. ICDs raise no new moral issues with respect to
this question. For example, if the patient were irreversibly
and imminently dying of a painful cancer and had recurrent
ventricular tachycardia, one would be perfectly justified in
not placing an ICD. Rationally, if the patient had an ICD
implanted 2 years ago and now develops a painful cancer
and death is imminent, deactivating the ICD seems just as
justifiable as withholding it. What the studies of Goldstein
at al. tell us, however, is that what seems equivalent
according to the logic of ethics continues to feel psycholog-
ically different to both patients and practitioners. Clinicians
must be sensitive to these feelings in dealing with concrete
clinical cases.
CONTINUOUS VS. INTERMITTENT?
Does the fact that the ICD is required intermittently rather
than continuously mark a moral difference? Certainly it has
not seemed so with respect to other life-sustaining treatments.
The discontinuation of an intermittent treatment such as
hemodialysis, should it become burdensome, has been judged
morally acceptable by persons holding a wide variety of ethical
viewpoints. In fact, as one of the cardiologists interviewed by
Goldstein at al. reports, the very fact that it functions only
intermittently might make it psychologically easier to deacti-
vate an ICD than to deactivate the pacemaker of a patient with
complete heart block. ICDs raise no new ethical issues in this
regard.
DURATION
Some might consider the duration of therapy morally impor-
tant. But is this true? If the ICD in the case of the patient
with cancer that I discussed above had been in place for
20 years instead of 2, with no changes except for batteries,
would the duration alone make us think that it would be
immoral to deactivate it if the patient were imminently dying,
in great pain, and the device might only prolong that state? It
seems to me this would not be the case. Consider a patient
who has been ventilator-dependent for 30 years after con-
tracting polio, is not depressed, and comes to the conclusion,
“I’ve had enough.” Might we not be more willing to accept his
request to discontinue the ventilator as a well thought out
and morally acceptable choice than if the same request were
made by the patient after only 1 week of ventilator support?
Duration of therapy does not seem to be the morally decisive
factor.
REGULATIVE VS. CONSTITUTIVE?
All therapies are restorative in intent,
10 but different therapies
restore patients in 2 broadly different ways. Some therapies
are “regulative.” That is to say they coax the body back toward
its own homeostatic equilibrium. Antidysrhythmic drugs and
antipyretics are regulative therapies in this sense. Other
therapies are “constitutive.” They take over a function that
the body can no longer provide for itself. Pacemakers and
insulin are constitutive therapies in this sense. Might this
distinction mark a moral difference between killing patients
and allowing them to die?
If anything, it would seem that the discontinuation of
constitutive therapies would raise more questions than the
discontinuation of regulative therapies. Mimicking physiology,
doing what the body no longer can do for itself, seems closer to
being “a part of the patient” than does a therapy that nudges
the body into healing itself.
Despite the psychological differences that this distinction
might raise, however, we still regularly accept the morality of
discontinuing constitutive therapies such as ventilatory sup-
port. The fact that a treatment is constitutive does not seem to
mark a moral difference between killing and allowing to die.
Further, the fact that ICDs are regulative, not constitutive,
suggests that this distinction cannot explain any special moral
worries about deactivating an ICD.
INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL
Does the fact that a technology has become internal to the
body mark the boundary between killing and allowing to die?
This question seems to come closer to explaining the concerns
raised by the patients and practitioners about deactivating
ICDs, but does it stand up to ethical analysis? Does the fact
that many new medical technologies are inside the body mean
that they have thereby become part of the person so that
deactivating an ICD or a pacemaker becomes morally equiva-
lent to discontinuing the function of a natural heart by
injecting KCl?
Elsewhere,
11 I have defined killing as an act in which an
agent performs an action that creates a new, nontherapeutic,
lethal pathophysiological state in a human being with the
intention of thereby causing that human being’s death. By
contrast, I have defined allowing to die as an act in which an
agent either performs an action to remove a treatment for a
preexisting fatal disease or refrains from action that would
treat a preexisting fatal disease, either intending that this
person should die by way of that act or not so intending. The
acts of allowing to die that have traditionally been thought
morally permissible are those in which the physician’s inten-
tions are to aim not at making the patient dead, but simply at
stopping the treatment.
These definitions make no reference to internal or external.
By these definitions, deactivating an external pacemaker is
morally equivalent to deactivating an internal pacemaker, and
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discontinuing an ICD.
B u ti st h i sc o r r e c t ?D o e sn o th a v i n gad e v i c ei n s i d ea
patient make it a part of the patient, part of her physiology,
so that stopping its function is killing? Certainly, this
intuition seems correct if one is talking about a heart
transplant. Stopping the function of a transplanted heart
with an injection of KCl seems morally no different from
stopping a native heart with an injection of KCl. And is not a
heart transplant every bit as much a technological inter-
v e n t i o na si sa nI C D ?
Upon further reflection, the fact that a treatment is
“inside” t h eb o d yd o e sn o t ,o fi t s e l f ,s e e mt od ot h em o r a l
work some might think it does. Consider and compare the
following technological interventions: an LHRH agonist
implant for prostate cancer and a skin transplant after a
severe burn. If one were to discontinue these therapies,
however, the mere fact that one treatment is placed under
the patient’s skin, whereas the other is placed over the
patient’ss k i nd o e sn o tc o n s t i t u t et h ed i f f e r e n c eb e t w e e n
killing and allowing to die. If the patient with prostate
cancer were experiencing hot flashes from the LHRH action
of the drug and having pain at the site of the implant, his
request to have it removed should be honored. But what if
the burn patient were to ask that the skin transplant be
removed, saying that she had grown tired of the need to take
anti-rejection medication? Without an intact integument,
t h ep a t i e n tw o u l de x p e r i e n c es e p s i sa n dd i e .M o s tp l a s t i c
surgeons would refuse to do this on the grounds that they
would be mutilating, if not killing, the patient, even if she
were otherwise dying from some other comorbid disease.
The mere fact that a technological intervention has been
placed under the skin does not seem to mark the moral
difference between killing and allowing to die.
REPLACEMENT VS. SUBSTITUTE THERAPY
So, then, perhaps those who have approached the question as
a standard application of the principles typically used in
bioethics are right after all. Perhaps there is nothing special
about devices such as ICDs.
Such a conclusion would be overly hasty. Jansen has
argued that the questions raised by advances in medical
technology such as ICDs are challenging our notions about
the boundaries of the self.
12 Particularly, as biotechnological
treatments become more “bio” than “techno,” we need to think
clearly about the characteristics that render a treatment a part
of the patient’s self, so that its discontinuation is morally
indistinguishable from killing. Jansen has offered 3 rules of
thumb for helping to judge whether a particular technological
intervention ought to be considered a part of the patient. She
suggests that there are more serious grounds for considering
the technological intervention a part of the patient if it is
located inside the patient, has been in the patient for a long
time, and plays something akin to what I have called a
constitutive therapeutic role.
Certainly, none of these factors is, of itself, morally decisive.
Jansen would not seem to disagree. I have explained above,
however, why I believe none of these 3 factors can bear the
weight of the distinction between killing and allowing to die.
And, whereas Jansen’s insight is correct—that some treat-
ments must truly be considered within the ontological bound-
aries of the patient’s “self”—I do not think the criteria she has
suggested fully capture the distinction. And while I further
agree with her that these will necessarily be rules of thumb
and that a “bright line” will be hard to draw, I think we can
press for greater clarity.
I would like to suggest 2 alternative guiding principles that,
while provisional hypotheses, might advance the discussion.
First, interventions that are regulative are never “self.”
These interventions are distinct from the organism and
extrinsic to its function, whether administered inside or
outside the body. They function by attempting to regulate
bodily functions, coaxing them back toward homeostasis. An
ICD is regulative. It does not supply the heart rhythm. Rather,
it shocks an abnormal cardiac rhythm back into normal sinus
rhythm. Although it is internal to the body, it is still not “self.”
One of the patients quoted by Goldstein et al. illustrates the
psychology of distinguishing between ICD and self nicely when
she describes how she talks to her ICD, treating it as
something other than her “self” although it is located within
her.
7 Regulatory therapies, no matter how sophisticated, and
whether located inside the body or not, can be thought about
just as one would think about withholding or withdrawing
more standard forms of therapy at the end of life. They may be
forgone if they are futile or if the burdens of treatment become
disproportionate to the benefits.
Second, some, but not all, constitutive therapies are
distinct from the self. I am not certain how best to
characterize this distinction, but my preliminary hypothesis
is that we can distinguish between constitutive therapeutic
interventions that have replaced the pathologically disor-
dered function and those that are substitutes for the
pathologically disordered function. The distinction between
these 2 kinds of constitutive therapies will not always be
clear, but I hope to make it clear enough that it can be
clinically and morally useful. In my view, in the proper
circumstances, it is morally permissible to withhold or
withdraw substitutive therapies, but the more an interven-
tion can be understood as a replacement therapy, the less it
seems morally appropriate to withdraw it.
HOW MIGHT REPLACEMENT AND SUBSTITUTIVE
THERAPIES BE DISTINGUISHED?
What I mean by a replacement therapy is a technological
intervention that participates in the organic unity of the
patient as an organism. This is what it really means to say
that a technological intervention has become “ap a r to ft h e
patient.” A replacement therapy is one that has become part
of the patient’s restored physiology. The most important
feature of a replacement therapy is that it provides the
function that has been pathologically lost, more or less in
the same manner in which the patient was once able to
p r o v i d et h i sf u n c t i o nw h e nh e a lthy. Thus, for instance, a
renal transplant is a replacement therapy, whereas perito-
neal dialysis (although it also takes place inside the body) is
a substitutive therapy.
Additional signs suggestive of an intervention being a
replacement therapy might include: (1) its responsiveness to
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such as growth and self-repair, (3) independence from external
energy sources or supplies, (4) independence from external
control by an expert, (5) immunologic compatibility, (6) phys-
ical integration into the patient’s body. The paradigmatic
replacement therapy is thus a well-functioning organ trans-
plant from an identical twin. The more a technological
intervention meets the conditions for being a replacement
therapy, the harder it is to contend that it is extrinsic to the
patient’s identity.
This distinction between replacement and substitutive types
of constitutive therapies might help us to say how far someone
who is opposed to euthanasia could reasonably go in classify-
ing certain cases as morally appropriate withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment rather than morally unacceptable cases
of killing. Whereas there is no absolute standard for judging
whether something is a replacement or a substitute, the more
clearly a technology can be classified as a replacement therapy,
the greater the case for judging that its discontinuation would
constitute an immoral act of killing. Replacement therapies
become part of the restored physiology of the patient, part of
the integrated unity of the patient as an intact individual
organism. To discontinue such therapies is better understood
as introducing a new lethal pathophysiological state rather
than discontinuing a treatment that is merely substituting for
a preexisting lethal pathophysiological lack of that function.
The discontinuation of a replacement therapy thus becomes
an act of killing.
To illustrate, consider the fact that there are cases in which
discontinuing insulin injections in a diabetic patient would be
morally appropriate. If the patient were imminently dying of a
malignancy, even the burdens of being injected with insulin or
having finger-stick checks for blood glucose might be consid-
ered disproportionate to the benefits. We ought therefore to
permit the discontinuation of insulin in some such cases.
Insulin injections clearly represent a case of a constitutive
rather than regulative therapy. The injections mimic the
normal physiology. However, giving insulin by injection is a
substitutive rather than replacement therapy. It provides the
normal physiological function in an abnormal way and the
treatment is not part of some new organic unity that has
altered the identity of the patient.
Consider a slightly different case, however. If the same
patient had previously undergone an islet cell transplant as a
treatment for his diabetes, it would seem highly morally
problematic to “discontinue” insulin therapy under these same
end-of-life conditions by injecting streptozosin to kill the
transplanted islet cells. Islet cell therapy is a replacement
therapy and, as such, the injection of streptozocin would be
mischaracterized if one were to describe it as the mere
discontinuation of a life-sustaining therapy. The cells would
have become part of the patient—an integrated aspect of her
restored physiology—and to destroy these cells would be
ethically indistinguishable from destroying the native islet cells
of a healthy person.
CONCLUSIONS
Those who are opposed to euthanasia but supportive of the
withholding and withdrawing disproportionately burdensome
life-sustaining treatments need not demur at the idea of
deactivating ICDs. The analysis I have presented shows that
deactivating an ICD can be ethically distinguished from killing
and considered a part of good palliative care. However, the
argument necessary to reach this conclusion will doubtless
prove challenging for persons unaccustomed to philosophical
thinking. The data from Goldstein et al. describe in detail how
much effort will be needed in making this argument clear for
cardiologists and patients. It is critically important, however,
that we begin thinking seriously and carefully about what
makes an intervention a part of the patient, rather than a
treatment that is extrinsic to the patient’s self, even if it is
located inside the patient’s body. The rapid pace of technolog-
ical progress assures us that these sorts of questions will
continue to surface in clinical practice. Ethics, as the most
practical branch of philosophy, must be prepared to keep pace
with these challenges.
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